On Man's Perfection in Righteousness

(12) The Twelfth Breviate

“Again the question arises,” he says, “how it is that man is unable to be without sin—by his will, or by nature? If by nature, it is not sin; if by his will, then will can very easily be changed by will.” We answer by reminding him how he ought to reflect on the extreme presumption of saying— not simply that it is possible (for this no doubt is undeniable, when God's grace comes in aid), but— that it is “very easy” for will to be changed by will; whereas the apostle says, “The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other; so that you do not the things that you would.” He does not say, “These are contrary the one to the other, so that you will not do the things that you can,” but, “so that you do not the things that you would.” How happens it, then, that the lust of the flesh which of course is culpable and corrupt, and is nothing else than the desire for sin, as to which the same apostle instructs us not to let it “reign in our mortal body;” by which expression he shows us plainly enough that that must have an existence in our mortal body which must not be permitted to hold a dominion in it—how happens it, I say, that such lust of the flesh has not been changed by that will, which the apostle clearly implied the existence of in his words, “So that you do not the things that you would,” if so be that the will can so easily be changed by will? Not that we, indeed, by this argument throw the blame upon the nature either of the soul or of the body, which God created, and which is wholly good; but we say that it, having been corrupted by its own will, cannot be made whole without the grace of God.

(13) The Thirteenth Breviate

“The next question we have to ask,” says he, “is this: If man cannot be without sin, whose fault is it—man's own, or some one's else? If man's own, in what way is it his fault if he is not that which he is unable to be?” We reply, that it is man's fault that he is not without sin on this account, because it has by man's sole will come to pass that he has come into such a necessity as cannot be overcome by man's sole will.

(14) The Fourteenth Breviate

“Again the question must be asked,” he says, “If man's nature is good, as nobody but Marcion or Manichæus will venture to deny, in what way is it good if it is impossible for it to be free from evil? For that all sin is evil who can gainsay?” We answer, that man's nature is both good, and is also able to be free from evil. Therefore do we earnestly pray, “Deliver us from evil.” This deliverance, indeed, is not fully wrought, so long as the soul is oppressed by the body, which is hastening to corruption. This process, however, is being effected by grace through faith, so that it may be said by and by, “O death, where is your struggle? Where is your sting, O death? The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law;” because the law by prohibiting sin only increases the desire for it, unless the Holy Ghost spreads abroad that love, which shall then be full and perfect, when we shall see face to face.

(15) The Fifteenth Breviate

“And this, moreover, has to be said,” he says: “God is certainly righteous; this cannot be denied. But God imputes every sin to man. This too, I suppose, must be allowed, that whatever shall not be imputed as sin is not sin. Now if there is any sin which is unavoidable, how is God said to be righteous, when He is supposed to impute to any man that which cannot be avoided?” We reply, that long ago was it declared in opposition to the proud, “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputes not sin.” Now He does not impute it to those who say to Him in faith, “Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.” And justly does He withhold this imputation, because that is just which He says: “With what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again.” That, however, is sin in which there is either not the love which ought to be, or where the love is less than it ought to be, — whether it can be avoided by the human will or not; because when it can be avoided, the man's present will does it, but if it cannot be avoided his past will did it; and yet it can be avoided—not, however, when the proud will is lauded, but when the humble one is assisted.