Sermons on the Song of Songs

But what has led us hither? It was, I think, my endeavour to show that greatness and righteousness (by which two perfections I affirmed every image of God to be constituted) are neither one and the same in the soul, nor one and the same with the soul, whilst maintaining on the contrary the equally orthodox position that the same two are identified in the Word and with the Word. And with regard to righteousness, what I have said is sufficient to make it evident that it is something distinct both from the soul and from the greatness of the soul, since the soul continues in existence after she has ceased to be righteous, and continues also to be great. But how am I to establish the distinction between the soul herself and her greatness? For the same argument which I employed to prove the soul distinct from her righteousness is not available here, since the soul cannot lose her greatness as she can lose her righteousness. Nevertheless I maintain that the soul is not her greatness, and my reason is this, because although the soul is never found without her greatness, that greatness may be found apart from the soul. Would you like to know where? In the angels. For the greatness of the angels is derived from the same source as the greatness of the soul, namely, from their capacity for things divine and eternal. But if the fact that the soul can exist without being righteous is sufficient to demonstrate her distinction from righteousness, it must equally follow that she is distinct from her greatness, from the fact that she cannot vindicate this greatness as something proper to herself. Since therefore righteousness does not belong universally to souls, and greatness does not belong exclusively to souls, it is manifestly and equally impossible for one or the other to be identified with the soul. Here is another argument. No form can be identical with that of which it is the form. Now her greatness is a form of the soul. Nor does the fact that it is inseparable from the soul prevent it from being a form of the same. For all essential differences are similarly inseparable, and not only all specific and strictly so-called properties, but also certain qualities common to many species, as well as innumerable other forms. The soul, consequently, is not her greatness any more than is the crow her blackness, or the snow its whiteness, or man his risibility or his rationality. And yet you will never find either a crow without blackness, or snow without whiteness, or a man who is devoid of risibility or rationality. It is just the same with the soul with regard to her greatness. Although inseparable, they are quite distinct from each other. How in truth could they be otherwise than mutually distinct, since the one is a substance and a subject in which the other inheres as a quality or an accident? It is only the supreme and uncreated Nature, Which is one God in three Persons, That vindicates for Itself such a pure and incommunicable simplicity of essence as excludes not alone all kinds of difference of thing from thing, but likewise all distinctions relating to place and time. For, abiding in Itself, that Divine Nature is whatever It has, and is what It is eternally and unchangeably. Things which are manifold elsewhere are reduced in It to unity, and things in their own natures distinct in It become identical, so that the multitude of Its perfections does not impair Its unity nor their variety prejudice Its simplicity. It contains in Itself all places and in their proper places disposes the whole universe of creatures, yet occupies no place Itself. It is unaffected by the succession of time which pursues its course outside and beneath It. It has no future to look forward to, no past to look back upon, no present to experience.

Let us keep far away, my dearest brethren, let us keep far away from those modern teachers, rather heretics than mere dialecticians, who most impiously maintain that neither the greatness by which God is great, nor the goodness by which He is good, nor the wisdom by which He is wise, nor the justice by which He is just, nor lastly the Divinity by which He is God, is Itself God. God is God, they say, by reason of His Divinity, yet His Divinity is not God. Perchance they think it would be degrading the Divinity to regard It as God, since It is so great that It makes God to be God. But if It be not God, what then is It? Either It is God, or It is something which is distinct from God, or It is nothing at all. Thou, the heretic, dost not concede that It is God. And I suppose thou wilt not assert that It is nothing, since thou confessest It to be so indispensably necessary to God that without It, not only would He not be God, but it is It alone which makes Him to be God. But if thou declarest the Divinity to be something which is distinct from God, this Something must be either greater than God, or less than God, or equal to God. But how can that be less than God which alone makes God to be God? It remains then to say that It is either greater than God or equal to Him. If It be greater than God, then we must admit that not God but the Divinity of God is the Supreme Good. And if It be equal to God, the consequence is that we have two Supreme Goods instead of one. Both these conclusions are equally opposed to Catholic truth. And as regards the greatness of God, His goodness, His justice, and His wisdom, I hold exactly the same as I do concerning His Divinity, namely, that all such perfections are one in God and one with God. For He is good by nothing distinct from that by which He is great, and He is just and wise by nothing distinct from that by which He is great and good, and He is all these at once by nothing distinct from that by which He is God, and He is God by nothing distinct from Himself.

But the heretic will say to me, “What? Dost thou deny that God is God by His Divinity?” Surely not. But I maintain that the same Divinity by Which He is God is Itself God, and I am obliged to do so lest I should be found asserting the existence of something more excellent than God. I also affirm that God is great by His greatness, but that this greatness is nothing distinct from Himself, because otherwise I should have to admit something greater than God. And I say that he is good by reason of His goodness, which however, I hold to be really identical with Himself, lest by allowing a distinction I should seem to myself to have discovered something better than God. Similarly with regard to the other divine perfections. Willingly, and securely, and without stumbling do I walk in the footsteps of him who has said, “God is great only by that greatness which is what He is, otherwise that greatness shall be greater than God.” These, my brethren, are the words of St. Augustine, that mighty hammer of heretics. If then anything at all can be rightly predicated of God, it will be more correct and more proper to say: God is Greatness, God is Goodness, God is Justice, God is Wisdom, than: God is great, God is good, God is just, God is wise.