Orth.— If then He was made flesh, not by mutation, but by taking flesh, and both the former and the latter qualities are appropriate to Him as to God made flesh, as you said a moment ago, then the natures were not confounded, but remained unimpaired. And as long as we hold thus we shall perceive too the harmony of the Evangelists, for while the one proclaims the divine attributes of the one only begotten— the Lord Christ— the other sets forth His human qualities. So too Christ our Lord Himself teaches us, at one time calling Himself Son of God and at another Son of man: at one time He gives honour to His Mother as to her that gave Him birth; at another He rebukes her as her Lord. At one time He finds no fault with them that style Him Son of David; at another He teaches the ignorant that He is not only David's Son but also David's Lord. He calls Nazareth and Capernaum His country, and again He exclaims “Before Abraham was I am.” You will find the divine Scripture full of similar passages, and they all point not to one nature but to two.
Eran.— He who contemplates two natures in the Christ divides the one only begotten into two sons.
Orth.— Yes; and he who says Paul is made up of soul and body makes two Pauls out of one.
Eran.— The analogy does not hold good.
Orth.— I know it does not, for here the union is a natural union of parts that are coæval, created, and fellow slaves, but in the case of the Lord Christ all is of good will, of love to man, and of grace. Here too, though the union is natural, the proper qualities of the natures remain unimpaired.
Eran.— If the proper qualities of the natures remain distinct, how does the soul together with the body crave for food?
Orth.— The soul does not crave for food. How could it when it is immortal? But the body, which derives its vital force from the soul, feels its need, and desires to receive what is lacking. So after toil it longs for rest, after waking for sleep, and so with the rest of its desires. So immediately after its dissolution, since it has no longer its vital energy, it does not even crave for what is lacking, and, ceasing to receive it, it undergoes corruption.
Eran.— You see that to thirst and to hunger and similar appetites belong to the soul.
Orth.— Did these belong to the soul it would suffer hunger and thirst, and the similar wants, even after its release from the body.
Eran.— What then do you say to be proper to the soul?
Orth.— The reasonable, the absolute, the immortal, the invisible.
Eran.— And what of the body?
Orth.— The complex, the visible, the mortal.
Eran.— And we say that man is composed of these?
Orth.— Yes.
Eran.— Then we define man as a mortal reasonable being.
Orth.— Agreed.
Eran.— And we give names to him from both these attributes.
Orth.— Yes.
Eran.— As then in this case we make no distinction, but call the same man both reasonable and mortal, so also should we do in the case of the Christ, and apply to Him both the divine and the human.
Orth.— This is our argument, although you do not accurately express it. For look you. When we are pursuing the argument about the human soul, do we only mention what is appropriate to its energy and nature?
Eran.— This only.
Orth.— And when our discussion is about the body, do we not only recall what is appropriate to it?
Eran.— Quite so.
Orth.— But, when our discourse touches the whole being, then we have no difficulty in adducing both sets of qualities, for the properties both of the body and of the soul are applicable to man.
Eran.— Unquestionably.
Orth.— Well; just in this way should we speak of the Christ, and, when arguing about His natures, give to each its own, and recognise some as belonging to the Godhead, and some as to the manhood. But when we are discussing the Person we must then make what is proper to the natures common, and apply both sets of qualities to the Saviour, and call the same Being both God and Man, both Son of God and Son of Man— both David's Son and David's Lord, both Seed of Abraham and Creator of Abraham, and so on.
Eran.— That the person of the Christ is one, and that both the divine and the human are attributable to Him, you have quite rightly said, and I accept this definition of the Faith; but your real position, that in discussing the natures we must give to each its own properties, seems to me to dissolve the union. It is for this reason that I object to accept these and similar arguments.
Orth.— Yet when we were enquiring about soul and body you thought the distinction of these terms admirable, and immediately gave it your approbation. Why then do you refuse to receive the same rule in the case of the Godhead and manhood of the Lord Christ? Do you go so far as to object to comparing the Godhead and the manhood of the Christ to soul and body? So, while you grant an unconfounded union to soul and body, do you venture to say that the Godhead and manhood of the Christ have undergone commixture and confusion?
Eran.— I hold the Godhead of the Christ aye, and His flesh too, to be infinitely higher in honour than soul and body; but after the union I do assert one nature.
Orth.— But now is it not impious and shocking, while maintaining that a soul united to a body is in no way subject to confusion, to deny to the Godhead of the Lord of the universe the power to maintain its own nature unconfounded or to keep within its proper bounds the humanity which He assumed? Is it not, I say, impious to mix the distinct, and to commingle the separate? The idea of one nature gives ground for suspicion of this confusion.
Eran.— I am equally anxious to avoid the term confusion, but I shrink from asserting two natures lest I fall into a dualism of sons.
Orth.— I am equally anxious to escape either horn of the dilemma, both the impious confusion and the impious distinction; for to me it is alike an unhallowed thought to split the one Son in two and to gainsay the duality of the natures. But now in truth's name tell me. Were one of the faction of Arius or Eunomius to endeavour, while disputing with you, to belittle the Son, and to describe Him as less than and inferior to the Father, by the help of all their familiar arguments and citations from the divine Scripture of the text “Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me” and that other, “Now is my soul troubled” and other like passages, how would you dispose of his objections? How could you show that the Son is in no way diminished in dignity by these expressions and is not of another substance, but begotten of the substance of the Father?
Eran.— I should say that the divine Scripture uses some terms according to the theology and some according to the œconomy, and that it is wrong to apply what belongs to the œconomy to what belongs to the theology.
Orth.— But your opponent would retort that even in the Old Testament the divine Scripture says many things œconomically, as for instance, “Adam heard the voice of the Lord God walking,” and “I will go down now and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it which has come to me; and if not I will know,” and again, “Now I know that you fear God” and the like.
Eran.— I might answer to this that there is a great distinction between the œconomies. In the Old Testament there is an œconomy of words; in the New Testament of deeds.
Orth.— Then your opponent would ask of what deeds?
Eran.— He shall straightway hear of the deeds of the making flesh. For the Son of God on being made man both in word and deed at one time exhibits the flesh, at another the Godhead: as of course, in the passage quoted, He shows the weakness of the flesh and of the soul, the sense namely of fear.
Source: Dialogues ("Eranistes" or "Polymorphus") (New Advent)